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INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, a Texas appellate court reprinted the transcript of a telephone 
message left by Carol Alvarado for her husband’s automobile liability 
insurance provider following a car accident that he had caused:  
Hello. This is Carol Alvarado calling, and I’m calling in response to a letter 
of March 17, 2003, that I just received that’s postmarked April 16, 2003. I’m 
speaking on behalf of my husband because I’m his guardian. He’s had more 
problems since this accident of April 17th and the reason I’m calling is, as 
far as we’re concerned, you can just go ahead and deny coverage for that 
accident; that would be fine with us if you just deny coverage with regard to 
the lawsuit. Just inform the parties that you’re denying coverage, send us a 
copy of the letter, and I mean that’s fine. We have—we having nothing that 
they can—there’s nothing that they can do to us by suing us because, well, 
you know, we’re pretty well judgment proof anyway, and my husband is 
injured. I, myself, have cancer, so we just don’t have the resources, the en-
ergy to be involved in this at all. I don’t have a phone. I can’t call you back, 
so just go ahead and deny coverage with regard to that accident of that day, 
April 17, 2001. I’m speaking on behalf of my husband as his guardian and 
that’s fine with us. Thanks.1 
In response to this message, Mr. Alvarado’s automobile liability insurance 
provider indeed denied coverage. It declined to defend him in the lawsuit 
the victim brought following the accident. In that suit, the victim won a 
default judgment, and subsequently sued the insurer for the proceeds.2 
Claiming that Mr. Alvarado had breached the policy’s cooperation clause, 
the insurer asserted that the policy had been nullified and argued that it 
could not be forced to indemnify Mr. Alvarado against the liability stem-
ming from the accident.3 The Trevino court accepted this argument and 
denied the victims injured by Mr. Alvarado the right to collect their default 
judgment from the proceeds of his policy.4 Neither the victims nor the 
court should have had any reason to doubt the truth behind Ms. Alvarado’s 
statement that she and her husband were judgment-proof; in fact, most 
people are.5 But neither should we underestimate the impact of her phone 
message. By refusing to cooperate with his insurer—indeed by refusing any 
involvement with the claims process—following an accident he caused, Mr. 
 
1 Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trevino, 202 S.W.3d 811, 816-17 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006). 
2 Id. at 813. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 818.  
5 See infra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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Alvarado substantially decreased the likelihood that the victims of his 
negligence6 would receive any compensation for their injuries.  
At the heart of this problem is the policyholder’s duty to cooperate in 
the investigation and disposition of his claims, and the general acceptance of 
that duty as a condition precedent to coverage under a liability insurance 
policy. Where, as in Trevino, a court accepts the argument that the policy-
holder breached this duty, the victim’s chances at a full recovery plummet, 
because recovery for tort damages is almost impossible if limited to the 
personal assets of the tortfeasor.7 This Comment begins from the premise 
that, in a largely judgment-proof society, the cooperation clause in liability 
insurance policies creates perverse incentives for both policyholders and 
insurers. If breached, the cooperation clause enables the insurer to avoid 
indemnification duties, and the insurer benefits from the policyholder’s 
noncooperation. Likewise, because all a judgment-proof policyholder stands 
to lose if found in breach is an unenforceable personal liability, he has no 
incentive to actively cooperate. When parties respond to these incentives, 
they impose the costs of accidents on their innocent victims.  
Liability insurance literature has identified three central duties owed by 
the insurer to the policyholder that grow from the standard personal 
liability contract: the duty to defend covered claims against the policy-
holder,8 the duty to indemnify the insured against liability within policy 
limits stemming from covered claims,9 and the duty to settle those claims 
 
6 The issue of Mr. Alvarado’s negligence was litigated in his absence, and the court entered a 
default judgment in favor of the two victims. Trevino, 202 S.W.3d at 813.  
7 See Tom Baker, Liability Insurance As Tort Regulation: Six Ways That Liability Insurance 
Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 4 (2005) (exploring liability insurance’s “funda-
mental effect on . . . collectibility—the defendant’s ability to pay and the facility with which the 
defendant can be made to pay”). Professor Baker argues that this effect on collectibility is so great, 
and that liability insurance is so overwhelmingly its only source, that a tortfeasor’s applicable 
liability policy has become a “de facto element” of tort liability. Id. at 3; see also Jason M. Solomon, 
Equal Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1765, 1818 (2009) (noting that in the 
most common varieties of tort cases, “almost every person or entity sued is going to have a 
liability insurance provider that will take over the defense of the case and pay the cost of any 
settlement or judgment”). 
8 See 14 STEVEN PLITT, DANIEL MALDANADO & JOSHUA D. ROGERS, COUCH ON IN-
SURACE § 200:1 (3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter 14 COUCH] (“Most jurisdictions consider the duty to 
defend as arising from the contractual relationship produced by the insurance policy.”); see also 
Tom Baker, Liability Insurance Conflicts and Defense Lawyers: From Triangles to Tetrahedrons, 4 
CONN. INS. L.J. 101, 102 (1997) (“Most liability insurance policies assign the company the 
‘duty’ . . . to defend the insured whenever the insured requests a defense against a defined set of 
claims.”). 
9 See 14 COUCH, supra note 8, § 200:3 (“In liability insurance policies generally, an insurer 
assumes . . . the duty to indemnify the insured, that is, to pay all covered claims and judgments 
against insured . . . .”); see also Ellen S. Pryor, The Stories We Tell: Intentional Harm and the Quest 
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for a reasonable amount when feasible.10 The duty to cooperate stands 
opposite these as the central duty owed by the policyholder to the insurer. 
But while scholars have extensively examined, analyzed, and critiqued the 
insurer’s duties of defense,11  indemnification,12  and settlement,13  the in-
sured’s duty to cooperate has not been adequately scrutinized. This Com-
ment seeks to begin the scholarly discussion of the duty to cooperate by 
examining its impact on policyholder and insurer incentives, as well as on 
the resulting allocation of the costs of accidents. It goes on to propose 
several adjustments aimed at bringing the duty to cooperate back in line 
with its stated goals, as well as those of liability insurance in general.  
Importantly, much of the harm this Comment seeks to eradicate arises 
when policyholders refuse to cooperate with their insurance companies 
when sued on a covered claim. While there are many breeds of non-
cooperation,14 there is no indication—nor does this Comment suggest—that 
noncooperation is the prevalent policyholder reaction to being sued. 
Presumably, many policyholders comply with the requests of their insurers 
for reasons having little to do with their net worth: what the insurer 
requests may not present a burden, the policyholder may know the victim 
and affirmatively want to speed up the claims process, or the policyholder 
may simply believe that cooperating is the right thing to do. All of which 
prompts the question of whether this Comment ventures to fix that which, 
according to the old cautionary maxim, “ain’t broke.” But a system of 
liability insurance should not entrust its efficacy to the goodwill of its 
 
for Insurance Funding, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1721, 1730 (1997) (describing the insurer’s promise “to pay 
those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages. This is the duty to pay—
often termed the duty to indemnify” (internal quotations and footnotes omitted)). 
10 See 14 COUCH, supra note 8, § 203:12 (discussing the “[d]uty of reasonable settlement, 
generally”); see also Kyle D. Logue, Solving the Judgment-Proof Problem, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1375, 1379 
(1994) (“Although the precise statement of this duty varies, most courts require that the insurer 
give ‘equal consideration’ to the interests of insureds when deciding whether to settle or litigate a 
claim.” (internal footnotes omitted)). 
11 See generally Betty R. Dohoney, The Liability Insurer’s Duty to Defend, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 
451 (1981); Susan Randall, Redefining the Insurer’s Duty to Defend, 3 CONN. INS. L.J. 221 (1997); 
Comment, The Insurer’s Duty to Defend Under a Liability Insurance Policy, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 734 
(1966). 
12 See, e.g., Pryor, supra note 9, at 1725-29 (discussing the parameters of the insurer’s duty to 
indemnify for acts of intentional harm). 
13 See generally Seth J. Chandler, Reconsidering the Duty to Settle, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 741 (1993); 
Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113 (1990); see also generally Charles Silver, A 
Missed Misalignment of Interests: A Comment on Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 77 VA. L. REV. 1585 
(1991). 
14 See infra Part II.  
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policyholders without an effective backstop of enforcement.15 If, as Professor 
Kenneth Abraham suggests, insurers can be “understood as the intermediary 
through which individuals motivated by concern for themselves become 
part of an enterprise that transforms selfish concern into altruism,”16 a 
structural defect in the policy that allows (indeed encourages) both the 
insurer and the policyholder to subvert that goal should not be forced to 
hang its remedial hopes upon an economically irrational goodwill. To be 
sure, voluntary policyholder cooperation serves liability insurance in many 
ways: it speeds up what is often a drawn out process,17 reduces costs to 
insurers who are not forced to track down the policyholder and coerce 
cooperation,18 and promotes the truth about the circumstances surrounding 
accidents.19 Relying on such voluntary cooperation, however, not merely to 
improve the delivery of insurance, but to hold the system together, is to beg 
divergent outcomes. This Comment proposes a duty to cooperate that 
instead relies on structural guarantees to serve the compensatory ends of the 
liability insurance system.  
Part I examines the prevalent composition and interpretations of the 
cooperation clause and discusses in more detail the ways in which these 
interpretations create perverse incentives in practice. Part II details three 
categories of cases in which policyholders respond to such incentives. Part 
III identifies and evaluates two present judicial responses to this problem. 
Finally, Part IV offers a tentative solution to the problem, centered on 
altering the remedy for a breach of the cooperation clause to render it both 
a meaningful incentive for policyholder compliance and a meaningful 
guarantee of victim compensation.  
 
15 See Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2013) (manuscript at 38), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2016320 (describing a conception 
of insurance as a form of governance, in which “ongoing responsibilities and rights should run 
among the policyholders, and [in which] insurers should be obligated to enforce these rights and 
responsibilities”). Far from obligating insurers to enforce the duty to cooperate, the incentives 
created by the cooperation clause not only shift that burden to the policyholders but also enable 
insurers to benefit when policyholders ignore those rights and responsibilities.  
16 Id. (manuscript at 50). 
17 See infra note 44 and accompanying text. 
18 For an example of a policyholder who decidedly failed to mitigate such investigatory ex-
penses, see Founders Ins. Co. v. Shaikh, 937 N.E.2d 1186, 1190-91 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). In 
attempting to track down a noncooperative policyholder, the insurer’s travails included sending 
private investigators to two addresses and a former place of employment and investigating 
whether the policyholder was incarcerated. Id. 
19 See infra text accompanying notes 31-32.  
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I. THE COOPERATION CLAUSE BY DESIGN 
The policyholder’s duty to cooperate is reflected in the virtual omni-
presence of a cooperation clause in consumer liability insurance policies.20 
Though a cooperation clause of some variety is found in almost every 
liability policy,21 this Comment focuses solely on such provisions and their 
effects in consumer automobile and consumer homeowner policies. The 
purpose of this limitation is three-fold. First, because such policies invaria-
bly deprive the policyholder of any bargaining power,22 and the standard 
language of such policies always includes a cooperation clause, the duty to 
cooperate is an unavoidable and uniform element of insurance in this 
context. Examining the duty to cooperate against this backdrop thus 
provides a consumer class with largely identical protections and obligations, 
free of the variations and personalizations that characterize more complex 
commercial policies.23 This limitation also obviates the need for any analysis 
of the policyholder’s level of sophistication. Second, because this Comment 
centers its criticism of the duty to cooperate on the deprivation of compen-
sation for injured third-party tort victims through unilateral policyholder 
action, it demands a landscape in which that action can be isolated and 
analyzed as an individual, rational decision. In the context of more complex 
policies and corporate policyholders, the decision not to cooperate is likely 
to implicate a more complicated set of considerations beyond the present 
scope.24 Third, personal liability insurance premiums comprise the vast 
 
20 See 14 COUCH, supra note 8, § 199:3 (“[I]nsurance policies, whether they are liability or 
indemnity policies, include what is commonly referred to as a ‘cooperation clause.’ In instances 
where a policy does not include such a clause, one has been implied in law.” (footnote omitted)). 
21 See, e.g., ISO Props., Inc., Commercial Gen. Liab. Coverage Form § IV(2)(c) (2003) (on 
file with author) (“You and any other involved insured must: . . . Cooperate with us in the 
investigation or settlement of the claim or defense against the ‘suit’ . . . .”); ISO Props., Inc., 
Exec. Liab. Coverage Form § VI(c) (2002) (on file with author) (“The ‘insured persons’ and the 
‘company’ shall, as a condition precedent to their rights under this Policy, give to us all infor-
mation, assistance and cooperation as we may reasonably require.”). 
22 See Am. Justice Ins. Reciprocal v. Hutchison, 15 S.W.3d 811, 817 (Tenn. 2000) (classifying 
automobile liability policies as “contracts of adhesion”); Douglas R. Richmond, Liability Insurers’ 
Right to Defend Their Insureds, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 115, 122 (2001) (“At the outset, insurance 
policies are adhesion contracts, and it arguably is bad contract law to assume the existence of a 
term that favors the stronger party to such a contract. This is especially true in the insurance 
context because, in most instances, the insured has no opportunity to even negotiate for terms. 
With rare exceptions, insurance policies are take-it-or-leave-it documents.” (footnote omitted)). 
23 See TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT 51 (2010) 
(“The public company D&O market . . . has sophisticated parties on both the buyer’s and the 
seller’s side of the transaction, each with legal counsel at their disposal.”). 
24 Such considerations may include customer or community goodwill, fiduciary duties owed 
to shareholders, or public image. 
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majority of annual insurance expenditures in the United States.25 Because 
this massive expenditure is spread through an equally large class of con-
sumers, these relatively small liability policies are a ubiquitous element of 
the American legal system, and a primary way in which Americans resolve 
legal disputes.  
In addition to being heavily standardized, the language of the coopera-
tion clause is quite vague, providing insurance companies with a catch-all 
assistance provision,26 the failure to comply with which results in nullifica-
tion of the policy.27 Courts have consistently ascribed two general purposes 
to the cooperation clause. First, it protects the insurance company’s inter-
ests by conditioning coverage on active participation by the policyholder in 
all phases of the claims process. Second, it inhibits collusion between the 
policyholder and the victim by allowing the insurance company to avoid 
indemnification altogether should the policyholder attempt to “throw” the 
defense.28 As currently articulated and enforced, however, the cooperation 
 
25 See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW 
FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11, at 69 (2008) (noting that, at the time of publication, 
automobile liability insurance expenditures were twice those for worker’s compensation insurance, 
more than five times those for medical malpractice insurance, and at least seven times those for 
products liability insurance). 
26 See, e.g., Travelers Prop. Ins. Cas. Co., Homeowners Policy § II(3)(c) (Policy no. [redact-
ed]) (on file with author) (obligating the policyholder, “at our request, [to] help us (1) to make 
settlement; (2) to enforce any right of contribution or indemnity against any person or organiza-
tion who may be liable to any insured; (3) with the conduct of suits and attend hearings and trials; 
(4) to secure and give evidence and to obtain the attendance of witnesses . . . .”); Allstate Ins. 
Co., Deluxe Select Value Homeowners Policy § II(1)(c) (Sample Policy) (on file with author) 
(“At our request, an insured person will: 1) cooperate with us and assist us in any matter 
concerning a claim or suit; 2) help us enforce any right of recovery against any person or 
organization who may be liable to an insured person; 3) attend any hearing or trial.”). 
27 See 14 COUCH, supra note 8, § 199:13. Various jurisdictions also require that the policy-
holder’s breach be both material and substantial and that it result in prejudice to the insurer before 
the insurer can raise it as a defense to a request for indemnification. See infra Section III.A. 
28 See, e.g., Wildrick v. N. River Ins. Co., 75 F.3d 432, 436 (8th Cir. 1996) (“The purpose of 
a cooperation clause is to protect insurers and prevent collusion between insureds and injured 
parties.” (quoting Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Chandler Mfg. Co., 467 N.W.2d 226, 229 
(Iowa 1991))); United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Morris, 741 P.2d 246, 250 (Ariz. 1987) (“[T]he purpose 
of a cooperation clause is to prevent insureds from compromising a claim for which the insurer 
unconditionally has assumed liability under the policy, thus obviating, at least to the extent of the 
policy limit bargained for, the insured’s exposure to personal liability.” (citing Cay Divers, Inc. v. 
Raven ex rel. Lloyds of London, 812 F.2d 866 (3d Cir. 1987))); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meckna, 144 
N.W.2d 73, 81 (Neb. 1966) (“The purpose of the cooperation clause is to prevent collusion 
between the injured and the insured and to facilitate the handling of claims by the insurer.” 
(quoting MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sailors, 141 N.W.2d 846, 849 (Neb. 1966))); Am. Policyholder’s 
Ins. Co. v. Baker, 409 A.2d 1346, 1348 (N.H. 1979) (“The purpose of a cooperation clause is to 
protect the insurer in its defense of suits by obligating the insured not to intentionally and 
deliberately take any action which would substantially affect adversely the insurer’s defense, 
settlement or other handling of the claim.” (citing Portsmouth Hosp. v. Indem. Ins. Co., 242 A.2d 
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clause fails to serve either of these purported purposes in a great number of 
cases, because most policyholders are judgment-proof against tort liabil-
ity.29 In theory, the cooperation clause derives its effectiveness from the 
threat of what happens when it is breached—namely requiring the policy-
holder to pay the judgment himself. But while the specter of personally 
financing a judgment should ideally serve as a sufficient deterrent to 
inimical or collusive behavior, to a judgment-proof defendant the deterrent 
 
398, 401 (N.H. 1968))); Am. Sur. Co. v. Diamond, 136 N.E.2d 876, 879 (N.Y. 1956) (“The 
purpose of the cooperation clause is to constrain the assured to co-operate in good faith with the 
insurance company in the defense of claims.” (citing Wenig v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 61 N.E.2d 
442, 444 (N.Y. 1945))); Smith v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 830 A.2d 108, 113 (Vt. 2003) (“The 
primary purpose of a cooperation clause is to enable insurers to make a proper investigation while 
the information is fresh, enable them to decide upon their obligations, and protect them from 
fraudulent and false claims.”); State v. Hydrite Chem. Co., 582 N.W.2d 411, 420 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1998) (“The basic purpose of a cooperation clause is to protect the insurer’s interests and to 
prevent collusion between the insured and the injured party.” (quoting Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Int’l 
Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 579 N.E.2d 322, 327 (Ill. 1991))). 
29 See Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603, 609 
(2006) (“[I]n the absence of liability insurance, most Americans are highly judgment-proof . . . 
this result is primarily attributable to legal rules that shelter assets and income from collection, 
rather than to simple inability to pay.”). As Professor Gilles suggests, judgment-proof status goes 
beyond mere inability to pay. Even a highly solvent defendant is unlikely to finance a judgment 
with personal assets. See Tom Baker, Liability Insurance, Moral Luck, and Auto Accidents, 9 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 165, 173 (2007) [hereinafter Baker, Moral Luck] (“[A]utomobile 
accident lawyers report that individual defendants almost never have to pay any of their own 
money to settle a claim or satisfy a judgment. As a result, auto accident cases are, in practice, 
about collecting insurance.” (footnotes omitted)); Tom Baker, The Blood-Money Myth, LEGAL 
AFFAIRS, Sept.–Oct. 2002, at 43 (“Plaintiffs almost never collect real money from real people in 
ordinary tort cases . . . not only because it’s more difficult to collect money from people than 
from insurance companies, but also because plaintiffs and their lawyers have significant moral 
qualms about squeezing ‘blood money’ out of ordinary people for an ordinary wrong.”). In other 
words, not only are victims unlikely to collect from defendants without insurance, but defendants 
without insurance are unlikely to be sued in the first place. See Baker, supra note 7, at 5 (character-
izing liability insurance as “a de facto element of tort liability”); Kent D. Syverud, On the Demand 
for Liability Insurance, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1629, 1634 (1994) (arguing that Americans “are most likely 
to find an attorney to handle [a] case and then to collect a judgment when [the] complaint alleges 
conduct covered by a liability insurance policy”). The pervasiveness of judgment-proof defendants 
would seem to suggest a significant lack of demand for liability insurance beyond mandatory 
schemes, but Professor Lynn LoPucki has suggested that  
[e]ven a judgment-proof debtor may purchase liability insurance in the hopes of 
avoiding the necessity to file under Chapter 11 to deal with its obligations, to satisfy 
contracting parties who require them to carry insurance, to avoid the adverse public-
ity that may accompany financial irresponsibility, or merely to satisfy a felt moral 
obligation. Minimal levels of liability insurance coverage might well persist in a 
world where judgments could not be enforced. 
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 76 (1996).  
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capacity of such a threat is substantially weakened.30 This is what is known 
as the “judgment-proof problem.” It calls into serious doubt whether the 
cooperation clause can effectively serve either of its purported goals.  
At the heart of both stated goals—protecting insurer interests and pre-
venting collusion—is a truth-serving function. The cooperation clause relies 
on the threat of personal liability to ensure full and active policyholder 
participation in the claims process—from investigation to settlement, and in 
rare cases, to trial.31 An involved and cooperative policyholder furthers the 
insurance company’s interests by ensuring that all relevant facts are dis-
closed in a timely fashion. Without the policyholder’s opposing account of 
the accident, the plaintiff has substantially greater leverage in his efforts to 
raise the settlement price. 32  Similarly, the threat of personal liability 
theoretically ensures that when the policyholder does participate, he does so 
in a truthful and noncollusive manner. But this model demands a meaning-
ful threat to scare out truthful disclosure and cooperation, something that is 
not possible in a largely judgment-proof society. This dynamic transforms 
the cooperation clause into an entirely different beast. With no meaningful 
economic incentive to cooperate, a rational policyholder will not go out of 
his way to aid his insurer. His insurer, in turn, will not indemnify him 
against his liability. In this way, the judgment-proof problem alters the 
cooperation clause in practice and dramatically inflates its importance. 
Nullification of the policy—once the insurer’s seldom used ace-in-the-
hole—now becomes the rule rather than the exception, with the cooperation 
clause serving as a reliable escape hatch. 
The policyholder’s incentives should not be the sole source of concern; 
the potential for insurer opportunism is also significant. An insurer that 
learns of a policyholder’s claim, and knows that the policyholder is likely to 
be judgment-proof, has little incentive to ensure cooperation. When the 
 
30 See LoPucki, supra note 29, at 82 (suggesting that, “[i]n a compulsory insurance system 
with judgment-proof insureds, th[e] incentive [to comply with the cooperation clause] . . . 
disappears, and insureds may be reluctant to cooperate”). But see Baker, Moral Luck, supra note 29, 
at 173-74 (noting that defendants in automobile accident cases often fail to realize that they are 
judgment-proof, a fact that their insurance companies routinely exploit).  
31 See Baker, Moral Luck, supra note 29, at 174 (“[T]he bureaucratization of the automobile 
insurance claims adjustment process means that the vast majority of automobile liability claims are 
settled, typically without formal admission of fault . . . and many of those claims are settled 
without a lawsuit or other public record of the claim.”). 
32 Of course, the policyholder’s account will not always serve to mitigate this leverage. First, 
that account could reveal the policyholder to be entirely at fault. Alternatively, if the claim arises 
in a no-fault state, then the policyholder’s account will theoretically have no impact on the result 
at all. For an account of the history of the “No-Fault Movement” and of how it has failed to take 
hold in more than a few states, see ABRAHAM, supra note 25, at 92-103.  
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policyholder, who has already paid his premiums, fails to cooperate, the 
insurer benefits by avoiding the payout, thereby creating the perverse 
incentive for the insurer to discourage cooperation, or at least to construe 
every minor lapse in participation as a breach of the duty to cooperate.  
In one sense, this arrangement still serves both of the clause’s goals, al-
beit in a very different manner. First, while policyholder cooperation cuts 
some investigative costs, avoiding indemnification altogether is perhaps the 
greater windfall. Second, while this transformed cooperation clause fails to 
serve as a meaningful disincentive to collusion, it still equips insurance 
companies with a tool to deny coverage should they detect it. But all this is 
far from the truth-seeking model of the cooperation clause implicitly 
endorsed by courts, and for which I have a strong preference.33 Refusing to 
indemnify a judgment-proof policyholder leaves the accident victim with a 
virtually uncollectible judgment. Even if that victim is inclined to attempt 
to collect on the judgment, to do so requires the victim to expend his own 
resources to pursue the personal assets of someone who is quite possibly a 
member of his own community. From the victim’s perspective, any realistic 
hope of recovery depends on the cooperation of two parties, neither of 
whom has any incentive to do so.  
To this point, criticism of the cooperation clause has been framed by a 
purely theoretical examination of the existing incentive structure assuming 
a policyholder class that is largely judgment-proof. Part II of this Comment 
will move beyond the theoretical and examine the effects of these misaligned 
incentives as borne out by the case law. 
II. THE COOPERATION CLAUSE IN PRACTICE: 
THREE CATEGORIES, ONE RESULT 
Policyholders do respond to these perverse incentives. Though non-
economic incentives to cooperate abound and are followed frequently,34 
many policyholders respond more powerfully to the economic ones and 
 
33 Only when the cooperation clause serves a robust, truth-serving function can the liability 
insurance system truly support and enable our notion of tort law. Although, throughout this 
Comment, I criticize the inability of the current system to adequately compensate accident 
victims, I posit that it is also important to compensate the right victims with proportionately correct 
amounts, by allowing legal doctrines like contributory negligence and assumption of risk to impact 
settlement values. 
34 Judgment-proof individuals have no economic incentive to purchase nonmandatory liability 
insurance at all. Still, some do, either because they overestimate their risk of personal liability, or 
because they respond to certain noneconomic incentives, such as moral obligation. See LoPucki, 
supra note 29, at 76. A great number of policyholders likely cooperate in the claims process for 
substantially similar reasons. 
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refuse to cooperate in the investigation of their claims. Because of the 
overwhelming tendency of cases involving personal liability insurance to 
settle,35 case law adjudicating cooperation clause disputes is scant.36 There 
are, however, three identifiable categories of cases involving defendants who 
breach the duty to cooperate and thus impose the costs of the accident on 
the innocent victim: the case of the prototypical noncooperative defendant, 
the Fifth Amendment case, and the policyholder settlement case.  
A. The Case of the Prototypical Noncooperative Policyholder 
The prototypical noncooperative policyholder injures someone in a way 
that gives rise to a potential liability covered by the terms of his policy but 
then fails to make or maintain adequate contact with his insurance company. 
The insurer then raises the policyholder’s breach of the duty to cooperate as 
grounds for a refusal to defend the policyholder or indemnify him against 
any resulting liability. In some cases, the policyholder may inform his 
insurer of the claim against him but fail to maintain any further contact 
despite frequent calls from the insurer to do so.37 In other cases, the policy-
holder may simply cause an accident and ignore the pending suit despite his 
knowledge of it and his potential coverage.38 Such cases typically result in 
 
35 See supra note 31.  
36 A Westlaw search for state and federal cases since 1990 containing the term “liability in-
surance,” either the term “duty to cooperate” or “cooperation clause,” and either the term 
“automobile” or “homeowner,” but excluding the term “CGL” (commercial general liability), 
produces a mere 239 results as of October 18, 2012. While there may be cases that, for one reason 
or another, fail to use the above terminology, that number is likely quite low. Additionally, a great 
number of these cases make only a passing reference to the cooperation clause without considering 
serious claims of its breach.  
37 See, e.g., Arton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 302 A.2d 284, 286, 289 (Conn. 1972) (finding a 
breach when the insured effectively vanished, refused to contact the insurer, and provided the 
insurer with neither his contact information nor that of any witnesses); Revolution Rent A Car v. 
Premier Ins. Co., 2005 Mass. App. Div. 155, 156 (Dist. Ct. 2005) (finding a breach when a 
policyholder failed to appear for three scheduled examinations under oath despite the fact that he 
attended a deposition two years later); Gabor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 N.E.2d 1041, 
1044 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (finding a breach of the duty to cooperate when “the insured[] 
refus[ed] to produce his income tax returns . . . which clearly prejudiced the insurer’s investiga-
tion into possible motives for arson”). 
38 See, e.g., Am. Country Ins. Co. v. Bruhn ex rel. Estate of Kaufman, 682 N.E.2d 366, 371-72 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (finding that a policyholder who failed to notify his insurer until three and a 
half years after the accident breached the cooperation clause, and that the insurer had no duty to 
indemnify him against the judgment against him). But see Cowan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 594 S.E.2d 
275, 276-77 (S.C. 2004). The Cowan court overturned a substantially similar decision and held that 
a South Carolina statute required the insurer to honor a judgment against an innocent automobile 
accident victim caused by a policyholder, despite his prejudicial lack of cooperation. Id. For a 
further discussion of this judicial solution to the undercompensation problem, and why it may not 
be the panacea it appears to be, see infra Section III.B. 
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one of two scenarios. In the first, the injured plaintiff receives a default 
judgment against the policyholder, which the plaintiff then attempts to 
enforce against the insurance company directly, essentially disputing the 
insurer’s claims that the cooperation clause was breached.39 Alternatively, 
the policyholder will surface long enough to settle the claim himself and 
assign his claims against the insurance company to the original plaintiff in 
exchange for the plaintiff’s agreement not to execute the settlement against 
him personally.40 Procedurally, the assigning of the claim occurs after the 
insurance company has refused to defend or indemnify, leaving the original 
plaintiff to stand in the shoes of the policyholder and litigate a breach of 
contract claim—alleging that the refusal to defend is in contravention of the 
policy—against the insurer. 
 Either scenario presents a significant obstacle to recovery for the vic-
tim. At the very least, the policyholder’s actions have added an additional 
turn to the victim’s road to recovery. And in a great many cases, this turn is 
an especially harrowing one that renders full recovery nearly impossible 
because of two exacerbating factors. First, in either scenario, the victim is 
left to litigate against the insurance company directly. Whether the victim 
pursues his claims against the policyholder’s insurer on his own, or inherits 
the policyholder’s claims, he is forced to use his own resources to bring an 
 
39 The current trend among the states is to permit such direct actions by the victim against 
the defendant’s insurer. See 7A LEE R. RUSS ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 104:7 (3d ed. 
2005) (observing the modern prevalence of statutes or policy provisions granting accident victims 
the right to sue injuring parties’ liability insurers directly). But see id. § 104:2 (“As a general rule, 
and in the absence of a contractual provision or a statute or ordinance to the contrary, at common 
law the absence of privity of contract between the claimant and the insurer bars a direct action by 
the claimant . . . .”). 
40 Such agreements have become common, and have come to be known as Miller-Shugart 
agreements after the famous case of Miller v. Shugart, 316 N.W.2d 729 (Minn. 1982). In that case, 
the court upheld the right of a policyholder to enter into a settlement with the victim whereby the 
policyholder assigned all claims against the insurer to the injured party in exchange for a covenant 
to limit execution of the settlement amount to insurance proceeds only. Id. at 732. These 
agreements are also sometimes referred to as Morris agreements after the similar—and similarly 
famous—case of United Services Automobile Ass’n v. Morris, 741 P.2d 246 (Ariz. 1987) (in banc). 
Because these agreements almost always arise absent insurer consent, they are ripe ground for 
cooperation clause disputes. States are divided on the question of whether and under what 
conditions such settlements are enforceable. Compare Corn Plus Coop. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 516 
F.3d 674, 680-81 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that, under Minnesota law, a “Miller-Shugart agreement 
is enforceable against an insurer if it meets three conditions: the insured provided notice to its 
insurer of its intent to enter into such agreement; the settlement is not the product of fraud or 
collusion; and the settlement is reasonable and prudent”), with Safeco Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 
84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 43, 44-46 (Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to allow the victim’s direct action suit to go 
forward against the policyholder’s insurance company when the policyholder and the victim had 
entered into a Miller-Shugart style settlement).  
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action against a repeat player with near unlimited expertise and resources.41 
At this point, the costs of litigation may outweigh the potential recovery, 
especially if he has first-party insurance to mitigate some of the losses,42 and 
the victim may abandon his claim. Of course, the insurance company could 
make a similar determination regarding the litigation and settle with the 
victim, but the insurer’s solvency and the victim’s disproportionate need for 
compensation combine to create overwhelming insurer leverage over 
settlement negotiations. 43  Additionally, insurance companies are rarely 
interested in the rapid settlement of claims, even when they have no 
intention of letting such a claim see the inside of a courtroom.44  
 
41 See Syverud, supra note 13, at 1160 (“Most automobile and property owners deal with one 
insurance company, and no more than one lawsuit. In contrast, insurance companies are bureau-
cratic repeat players who deal with many insureds and many lawsuits.”); see also Milton Heumann 
& Jonathan M. Hyman, Negotiation Methods and Litigation Settlement Methods in New Jersey: “You 
Can’t Always Get What You Want,” 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 253, 285 (1997) (arguing that 
repeat players like insurance companies are more willing to “play ‘hardball’” in settlement 
negotiations because the risk of any single loss at trial is outweighed by the benefits of settlements 
on favorable terms and the signaling effect such a strategy has on future would-be litigants). 
42 It is important to note, however, that first-party insurance coverage, such as medical or 
short-term disability, often fails to cover the entirety of the loss. See Jeffrey O’Connell & John 
Linehan, Neo No-Fault Early Offers: A Workable Compromise Between First and Third-Party Insurance, 
41 GONZ. L. REV. 103, 120 (2006) (“In the United States, coverage for various forms of accident 
loss remains tragically insufficient across the board . . . . [I]n many situations, an injured party 
must resort to the tort system to account for losses that remain uncompensated by first-party 
insurance.”). The tort system, however, is often incapable of closing this gap. Because tort 
compensation is so frequently limited to insurance proceeds, low policy limits are the biggest 
threat to the effectiveness of the tort system. See Gary T. Schwartz, Auto No-Fault and First-Party 
Insurance: Advantages and Problems, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 611, 628 (2000) (observing that the current 
system effectively limits liability to policy limits that are kept low by nonaggressive state 
mandatory minimums). 
43 See Robert W. Emerson, Insurance Adjusters and Plaintiffs’ Attorneys: From Claims Fraud 
Consensus to Settlement Reform, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 537, 553 (1993) (reporting the claims of plaintiffs’ 
attorneys that insurance companies often “wrongly refus[e] to pay or delay[] . . . paying bills in 
order to gain negotiating leverage over claimants”). 
44 As Professor Jay Feinman explains, 
There are a very significant number of large cases, probably an increasing number in 
the last few years, in which liability is relatively clear and it is also clear that the vic-
tim’s damages are substantial, yet the insurance company refuses to make an offer to 
settle the case, makes a disproportionately low offer that it refuses to raise, or makes 
an offer only very late in the process. 
Jay M. Feinman, Incentives for Litigation or Settlement in Large Tort Cases: Responding to Insurance 
Company Intransigence, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 189, 193-94 (2008); see also Campbell v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1148 (Utah 2001) (reporting evidence that “State 
Farm has systematically harassed and intimidated opposing claimants, witnesses, and attor-
neys . . . [and] instruct[ed] its attorneys and claim superintendents to employ ‘mad dog defense 
tactics’—using the company’s large resources to ‘wear out’ opposing attorneys by prolonging 
litigation, making meritless objections, claiming false privileges, destroying documents, and 
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The second exacerbating factor is the inherent information asymmetry 
whenever the victim is forced to litigate a cooperation clause dispute against 
the insurance company. Not only may the policyholder have indeed 
breached his duty to cooperate,45 but the information required to litigate 
that claim is neither readily available to the victim nor cheap to unearth.46 
To say nothing of the fact that the victim had nothing to do with it. Indeed, 
it is the insurer that will have the records detailing the number of attempted 
contacts with the policyholder, by what method, and with what result. And 
it is the policyholder who will have the information regarding receipt of those 
communicative efforts, reasons for not responding, and efforts to reestablish 
contact. While liberal discovery rules enable the injured victim to procure 
this information, the initial distribution of that information presents 
another opportunity for the policyholder’s apathy and the insurer’s strategic 
delay to threaten timely recovery. Again, while the victim’s likely goal in 
pursuing such an action against an insurer is to force an adequate settlement 
rather than to prevail in the dispute, the initial information asymmetry 
serves only to strengthen the insurer’s existing leverage over those settle-
ment negotiations.  
The case of the prototypical noncooperative policyholder often results in 
the allocation of a substantial portion of the loss neither to the party best 
positioned to absorb and spread it (the insurer), nor to the party most 
responsible for causing it (the policyholder). For purposes of illustration, 
consider the case of Martinez v. ACCC Insurance Co.47 There, two friends 
riding together in a car were injured when another driver ran a red light and 
the two cars collided.48 Following the accident, the driver who ran the red 
light could not be reached by his insurance company or by the private 
 
abusing the law and motion process”), rev’d, 548 U.S. 408 (2003); Tom Baker, Blood Money, New 
Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 288 (2001) 
(reporting industry accounts of “adjusters who delay paying claims of old people because those 
claims will be worth so much less once they die”). 
45 The broad and vague language of the standard cooperation clause often makes it quite easy 
for an insurer to make out a prima facie case of noncooperation, which, of course, it has every 
incentive to do. If the policyholder has failed to appear at a scheduled hearing or a deposition, it is 
quite clear that he has breached his duty to cooperate. For this reason, litigation often focuses not 
on the issue of the policyholder’s breach of the cooperation clause but on whether that breach was 
material and prejudicial. See infra Section III.A.  
46 A policyholder who has failed to cooperate with his insurer is unlikely to have a sudden 
change of heart and completely cooperate with the victim in making out the breach of contract 
claim against the insurance company, particularly because he has no skin in the game. The cost of 
uncovering this information through the discovery process increases the insurer’s leverage in the 
settlement process.  
47 343 S.W.3d 924 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011). 
48 Id. at 925.  
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investigator the insurance company hired, despite the repeated efforts of 
both.49 The Martinez court found the driver’s failure to cooperate in the 
investigation of his insurer’s claim to be a breach of the cooperation clause 
and upheld the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
insurer.50 The injuries for which the victims were seeking compensation 
were not insignificant; when the underlying tort case proceeded to judg-
ment due to the defendant’s failure to appear, the court entered a default 
judgment of more than $150,000.51 The procedural posture of this case 
reveals the victims’ assessment of their chances of collecting from the 
policyholder herself: armed with a default judgment of $150,000, the victims 
initiated an action against the defendant’s insurer rather than pursuing a 
garnishment action directly against the defendant.52 The victims’ willing-
ness not only to pursue such an action but also to appeal the initial loss at 
trial underscores the fact that many victims cannot depend on first-party 
coverage to wholly cover their losses. In this case, the victims went uncom-
pensated not because of any legal doctrine mitigating the policyholder’s 
liability, but because of his simple failure (or election not) to respond to his 
insurer’s phone calls.  
B. The Fifth Amendment Case 
Another category of cooperation clause dispute arises when the potential 
civil liability for which the policyholder is seeking indemnification is 
accompanied by potential criminal liability stemming from the same set of 
events. An example within the scope of this Comment might arise when a 
policyholder is both charged with vehicular manslaughter and sued for 
wrongful death.53 Often, a policyholder faced with potential concurrent 
 
49 Id. at 927. 
50 Id. at 929-30.  
51 Id. at 926. 
52 Id. at 927; see also Martinez v. ACCC Ins. Co., No. 08-03102-E, 2009 WL 8236036, at *1 
(Tex. Cnty. Ct. Oct. 1, 2009) (final judgment in the initial garnishment action). 
53 See, e.g., Miller ex rel. Estate of Hott v. Augusta Mut. Ins. Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d 727, 729 
(W.D. Va. 2004) (granting summary judgment to an insurer seeking nullification of the policy on 
noncooperation grounds where the policyholder both invoked the Fifth Amendment in his 
criminal murder proceeding and sought indemnification under a homeowner’s policy in the civil 
wrongful death action), aff’d, 157 F. App’x 632 (4th Cir. 2005); Anderson v. S. Guar. Ins. Co., 508 
S.E.2d 726, 732 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the homeowner-policyholder’s duty to 
cooperate in a civil assault suit was not affected by her invocation of Fifth Amendment rights in 
the concurrent criminal proceedings); Surabian v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 73-2564, 1977 WL 186340, 
at *1, *4 (R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 2, 1977) (holding that the policyholder breached the cooperation 
clause by invoking his Fifth Amendment right when faced with concurrent criminal and civil 
charges after stabbing a passenger in his car and causing her to fall from the car and injure herself).  
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criminal and civil liability will invoke his Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination in order to avoid making a statement concerning the 
incident at issue. But while such an invocation does not alter the defend-
ant’s rights in a criminal investigation, the refusal to provide an account of 
the accident is in clear violation of the policy’s cooperation clause.54 Insur-
ance companies use this breach to avoid indemnifying the policyholder 
against any resulting liability, exposing the policyholder to personal liability 
and leaving the victim to seek compensation from the policyholder’s 
personal assets or not at all. 
At the policyholder level, this structure seems unremarkable. It intro-
duces a trade-off into the policyholder’s decisionmaking calculus: he can 
either exercise his Fifth Amendment right in an effort to mitigate his 
criminal liability, or he can comply with the terms of the policy and miti-
gate his civil liability through indemnification. Imposing this dilemma upon 
a solvent policyholder may seem perfectly acceptable: he must choose 
between risking civil or criminal liability. But a judgment-proof policyholder 
transfers the ramifications of this dilemma to the accident victim.55 A 
judgment-proof policyholder does not even have an economic incentive to 
waive his Fifth Amendment rights. Such a policyholder is thus likely to opt 
for Fifth Amendment protection, removing the insurer from the civil 
litigation entirely and limiting the victim’s potential sources of compensa-
tion to the policyholder’s personal assets.  
The Fifth Amendment case often leaves the victim in the same position he 
finds himself in the case of the prototypical noncooperative policyholder56—
litigating against the insurer directly57—except that in the Fifth Amend-
ment case, the victim’s chances at recovery may be even further diminished. 
In these cases, the victim has little ground on which to rest a breach action 
against the insurer. The very nature of these cases entails an acknowledge-
ment by the policyholder that he is violating the terms of the policy due to 
countervailing criminal considerations. The victim is thus likely forced to 
 
54 See, e.g., Miller, 335 F. Supp. 2d at 733 (finding a breach of the duty to cooperate when the 
insured refused to make a statement to his insurer during investigation for a wrongful death action 
despite the fact that such refusal was made pursuant to the insured’s Fifth Amendment right); 
Anderson, 508 S.E.2d at 731 (holding that the policyholder “cannot wield her Fifth Amendment 
privilege as a shield and a sword by demanding coverage and a defense under the insurance 
contract, while at the same time refusing to answer questions material to determining [the 
insurer]’s duties under the contract”).  
55 But see infra text following note 58. 
56 See supra Section II.A.  
57 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
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argue either that the breach was not material or that the resulting prejudice 
to the insurer was not substantial.58 
Additionally, the judgment-proof problem applies significant pressure to 
the notion that policyholders are justifiably forced to make a trade-off in the 
Fifth Amendment case. Theoretically, if the liability insurance system forces 
upon the policyholder a choice between the criminally protective custody of 
the Fifth Amendment and its civil counterpart of indemnification, a 
structure that permits the policyholder to escape indemnification while 
simultaneously invoking the Fifth Amendment could be perceived as giving 
a windfall to the policyholder. A judgment-proof policyholder enjoys 
precisely this double protection. While the Fifth Amendment’s protection 
is uniform, a judgment-proof policyholder does not need insurer indemnifi-
cation to enjoy protection against personal civil liability; he has both 
protections immediately upon invocation of the Fifth Amendment. For the 
judgment-proof policyholder, the aforementioned choice becomes easy, and 
funnels compensation away from the victims of accidents. 
C. The Policyholder Settlement Case 
The final category of cooperation clause dispute arises when the policy-
holder settles the case with the victim without the consent of the insurance 
company. In most of these cases, the insurer will use this lack of consent as 
the basis of a breach action and refuse to indemnify.59 This basic fact 
pattern has many complex variations, including instances in which the 
insurer agrees to defend the policyholder but does so under a reservation of 
rights.60 This Comment, however, focuses on the subset of these cases in 
 
58 See infra Section III.A. 
59 See, e.g., Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Zavala, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1122 (D. Ariz. 2003) 
(holding that when an insurer has agreed to assume liability for a claim, a subsequent Morris 
agreement between the policyholder and the plaintiff violates the cooperation clause); Waddell v. 
Titan Ins. Co., 88 P.3d 1141, 1144 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (observing that a policyholder’s settlement 
without consent when the insurer has not expressed an intent to contest coverage is a violation of 
the duty to cooperate). 
60 “Reservation of rights” refers to an insurer’s decision to “reserve” its right to contest its 
obligation to cover the policyholder’s claim while nonetheless providing the policyholder’s 
defense. Courts are split as to whether the policyholder has a right to settle the case himself 
without the insurer’s consent where the insurer has made a reservation of rights. Compare Patrons 
Oxford Ins. Co. v. Harris, 905 A.2d 819, 828 (Me. 2006) (“[W]here the insured is being defended 
under a reservation of rights, the insured . . . may negotiate with the claimant and enter into a 
settlement that protects his interests.”), with Safeco Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 43, 
44, 45 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding, despite a reservation of rights, that “[w]hen the insurer provides 
a defense to its insured, the insured has no right to interfere with the insurer’s control of the 
defense, and a stipulated judgment between the insured and the injured claimant, without the 
consent of the insurer, is ineffective to impose liability upon the insurer”). The disposition of 
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which there has been no insurer reservation of rights and in which courts 
have generally found that unilateral policyholder settlement violates the 
policy.  
Illustrative is the case of Smith v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co.61 
There, the policyholder was contacted by the victim’s attorney before he 
had the chance to speak with his insurer.62 The two sides then entered into 
a consent judgment whereby the policyholder assumed a $10,000 liability in 
exchange for an agreement by the victim to limit execution of the judgment 
to insurance proceeds.63 The policyholder’s insurer attempted to set aside 
the consent judgment and conduct its own defense, but this effort was 
quashed by the court.64 However, when the victim initiated a collection 
action against the insurer seeking indemnification of the consent judgment, 
the appeals court found that the policyholder had breached the cooperation 
clause and that the insurer owed no duty to either party.65 That victims are 
frequently willing to enter into such Morris agreements, placing their last 
hope of recovery with the tortfeasor’s insurance company, reflects the 
prevailing attitude toward collecting tort judgments from personal assets.  
More so than the preceding two, this category presents a problem that is 
largely informational.66 If the victim knew ex ante that a settlement or 
consent judgment made without the insurer’s consent would not be enforce-
able in a subsequent action, he would never make such an agreement.67 
When such an agreement is made, blame rests with the victim’s attorney; 
some jurisdictions are less likely than others to allow a policyholder settle-
ment without consent to nullify the policy, but it is assuredly the attorney’s 
responsibility to be aware of the enforceability of such a settlement within 
the victim’s jurisdiction. Perhaps this category of case demands a different 
 
these cases also often depends on additional factors, such as whether the insurer refused to settle 
in bad faith and the amount of the proposed settlement vis-à-vis policy limits. 
61 61 S.W.3d 280 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). 
62 Id. at 282. 
63 Id.  
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 284.  
66 Although the main challenge in this category is informational, some perverse incentives 
remain. An insurer who knows that a policholder’s unilateral decision to settle will relieve it of any 
duty to indemnify has no incentive to prevent that outcome. By the same token, the savvy 
policyholder who settles on the condition that the victim’s collection be limited to insurance 
proceeds, e.g., supra text accompanying note 63, does not care (as an economic matter, anyway) 
whether that sum is collectible.  
67 What is odd about Smith is that the court felt the policyholder knew, or at least should 
have known, that the insurer would not be bound by the settlement. The court found that “the 
insured was put on notice that by entering into the consent judgment with [the victim], without 
notice to [the insurer], he placed his insurance coverage in jeopardy.” Smith, 61 S.W.3d at 284.  
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solution than the other two—one geared toward facilitating more robust 
notice of settlement consequences and earlier involvement of insurers. For 
while this category, like the preceding two, reveals an acknowledgement by 
both the policyholder and the victim that the former is likely judgment-
proof, this final category differs in that it involves an effort by the policy-
holder to preserve insurance proceeds nonetheless.68 In this way, these cases 
will arise only when parties fail to respond to the perverse economic 
incentives discussed above. If the policyholder were not judgment-proof, no 
rational victim would agree to limit execution on a judgment to one potentially 
dry source;69 if the policyholder were judgment-proof, no rational policy-
holder would take the time to negotiate and settle at all.  
D. The Impact of the Heavy Settlement Environment on  
Cooperation Clause Cases 
Examples in which these three types of cases are actually litigated in a 
courtroom are scant, because the vast majority of personal liability insurance 
cases are settled.70 This observation holds true at every stage of the insur-
ance litigation process. Even when the relationship between insurer and 
policyholder has broken down, if the victim pursues a direct action against 
the insurer, those parties are also almost certain to settle. Once the plaintiff 
is forced to attempt to collect from the defendant’s insurer, the cooperation 
clause surely plays a role in shaping settlement negotiations. The specter of 
a policyholder breach drives down the likelihood that the victim would 
prevail were the issue to proceed to trial. As a result, settlement values 
decrease. Additionally, the somewhat peculiar relationship between the 
victim and the insurance company71 imports three additional obstacles to 
the plaintiff’s attempt to achieve a fair settlement price.72  
 
68 On this final point: the temporal structure of the claim matters, as does the event that 
leads the insurer to raise the cooperation defense. If the policyholder fails to respond to his 
insurer, thereby prompting the insurer to disavow coverage, and then later surfaces to enter into a 
settlement or consent judgment with the victim, that case is properly characterized as belonging to 
one of the first two categories. The parameters and the ensuing observations of this third category 
hold true only when the policyholder’s settlement is the event that prompts the cooperation defense 
and when the insured is not otherwise giving the insurer the run-around. Only under these 
circumstances can the problem truly be deemed informational.  
69 This holds true unless the victim can secure a settlement premium in exchange for the 
uncertainty of collection from the insurer.  
70 See Baker, Moral Luck, supra note 29, at 174. 
71 See generally Baker, supra note 8, at 113. 
72 The first two obstacles resemble the aforementioned factors exacerbating the victim’s 
difficulties in making out a breach claim against the insurer. See supra text accompanying notes 41-46. 
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First, the victim’s settlement efforts are once again undermined by a 
massive information asymmetry. If a settlement negotiation is driven by the 
likelihood of success on the merits, then the party with the better infor-
mation about that likelihood has the upper hand.73 This party is undeniably 
the insurer. To be sure, given the relative infrequency with which these 
types of cases see actual judicial resolution, information is scarce to begin 
with. Yet it is quite certain that, whatever the facts, the insurer will have 
seen substantially similar cases. While nothing prevents plaintiffs’ attorneys 
from becoming experts at dealing with liability insurance companies, the 
latter always enjoys a broad institutional knowledge base.  
Second, the insurance company almost always has both institutional 
competence and resources that far outmatch anything the victim’s attorney 
could provide. Between the expertise to more accurately assess the victim’s 
claim, and its built-in legal advantages—including in-house counsel and 
simple financial clout—insurers have the institutional tools to drive down 
the eventual settlement price.74  
Third, the negotiating parties’ unequal levels of need for the funds at 
issue has a substantially negative impact on the victim’s efforts to achieve a 
favorable settlement. Almost by definition, the victim has a greater need to 
receive compensation than the insurer does to retain the funds. And while 
this disparity is likely present whenever an insurance company and an 
individual negotiate a settlement, it is especially acute when the negotiation 
is between the victim and the insurer against the backdrop of a potential 
cooperation clause breach. In those cases, the negotiation is likely to take 
place long after the accident occurred and the initial need for compensation 
arose. For an illustration of this point, consider again the case of Mr. 
Alvarado, whose wife left the message encouraging the insurance company 
to deny coverage a full two years after the accident occurred.75  
Additionally, the victim’s very pursuit of tort compensation suggests a 
financial gap between his first-party insurance coverage and the damages 
 
Their impact on the settlement process, however, is both more acute and more uniform, and 
universally impacts any victim who faces their injurer’s insurer directly. 
73 See Ben Depoorter, Law in the Shadow of Bargaining: The Feedback Effect of Civil Settlements, 
95 CORNELL L. REV. 957, 964 (2010) (noting the impact on settlement amounts of disparate 
levels of information). 
74 See Francis J. Mootz III, Holding Liability Insurers Accountable for Bad Faith Litigation Tac-
tics with the Tort of Abuse of Process, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 467, 519 n.136 (2003) (“[L]iability insurance 
carriers are particularly expert in sophisticated claims assessment and litigation and are constant 
repeat players in this realm.”). But see Baker, supra note 7, at 10 (noting that “[m]any liability 
insurance company executives would assert that their repeat player advantage is more than 
outweighed by the bias of judges and juries” and that this expectation drives settlement prices). 
75 See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.  
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stemming from the injury. The importance of this potential gap must not 
be understated. While many sources of first-party compensation—such as 
medical, disability, uninsured motorist, and life insurance—frequently cover 
typical injuries, not all Americans carry adequate amounts of such insurance. 
While the average automobile tort victim may have sufficient insurance to 
cover minor damages to a car, the same cannot be said when that damage is 
instead a broken leg, and even less so when the damage is a deceased 
spouse. As previously discussed, insurers’ responses to these pronounced 
levels of need is often to impose massive delays in the settlement process.76 
Delays in the settlement process work against a victim who cannot afford to 
wait for a better deal. Armed with the ability to wait as long as legally 
practicable before actually settling the claim, the solvent insurer can simul-
taneously deplete the victim’s resources, ratchet up the urgency of the 
victim’s need, and hence drive down the settlement value—all while 
incurring virtually no additional cost. 
III. THE COOPERATION CLAUSE IN COURT:  
MISGUIDED RESPONSES 
To their credit, courts have not ignored the problems caused by the con-
tinuing use of the cooperation clause in an increasingly judgment-proof 
environment. Professor Lynn LoPucki has observed that the “problem has 
been severe enough in the current system to prompt courts and legislatures 
in most states to adopt ‘reach and apply’ rules to prevent post-loss actions of 
insureds from voiding coverage or preventing recovery from insurers.”77 
Though Professor LoPucki provides several examples of such solutions,78 
one that is particularly noteworthy is that from the case of Storm v. Nation-
wide Mutual Insurance Co.79 In that case, the Virginia Supreme Court held 
that an injured party is a beneficiary under an automobile liability insurance 
policy from the moment the injury occurs, provided the vehicle was being 
 
76 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
77 LoPucki, supra note 29, at 82-83. 
78 See, e.g., Mandeville v. Shelby Mut. Plate Glass & Cas. Co., 5 Conn. Supp. 306, 309 (C.P. 
1937) (“The statute, to effectuate its manifest purpose to safeguard the rights of the injured person, 
prohibits any cancellation or annulment of the policy by any agreement between the insurance 
company and the assured after the injury.” (quoting Guerin v. Indem. Ins. Co., 42 A. 268, 270 
(Conn. 1928))). Some courts have construed mandatory insurance statutes even more liberally, as 
barring cancellation of the policy based not just on an agreement between the insurer and the 
policyholder, but also, in limited situations, on unilateral post-loss policyholder breaches. See infra 
notes 92-98 and accompanying text. 
79 97 S.E.2d 759 (Va. 1957). 
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operated with the consent of the policyholder.80 But such a response merely 
facilitates direct actions against insurers by victims. While providing 
victims with a cause of action potentially increases their chances of receiving 
compensation for their injuries, it fails to account for the fact that insurers 
can still defend against such causes of action by claiming that the policy-
holder breached the duty to cooperate. In any event, causes of action are 
widely available to victims either through similar judicial interpretation, 
legislative mandate, or as the result of particularly prevalent settle-and-
assign practices.81 This Comment starts with the assumption that victims 
can readily bring actions against insurers demanding indemnification of 
policyholder liabilities. The focus, instead, is on the significant obstacles to 
that action’s success. Thus, judicial action such as that driving Storm, while 
certainly a necessary precursor, cannot properly be classified as a response 
to the problem this Comment addresses.  
The judicial actions that follow can more properly be termed “responses,” 
but while they correctly identify the problem of victim undercompensation, 
they are largely inadequate because they focus too heavily on raising the bar 
for what is considered a breach of the cooperation clause rather than 
addressing the underlying problems of misaligned incentives. This Part 
identifies and evaluates two classes of judicial response—the erection of 
obstacles to the insurer’s use of the cooperation clause as a defense, and the 
eradication of the cooperation clause in mandatory insurance schemes. 
A. Obstacles to the Use of the Cooperation Clause 
Recognizing the basic contours of the problem of victim under-
compensation, courts in many jurisdictions have placed substantial hurdles 
in the path of insurers seeking to use a policyholder’s violation of the 
cooperation clause as a defense to indemnification. These obstacles take 
various forms and often stem from common law notions of breach of 
contract. Almost uniformly, courts have imposed on insurance companies the 
requirement that the policyholder’s failure to cooperate be prejudicial to the 
insurer before it can serve as the basis for a refusal to indemnify.82 The 
 
80 Id. at 762. 
81 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
82 See 14 COUCH, supra note 8, § 199:76 (“In order to be relieved of its obligations under an 
insurance contract, many jurisdictions take the view that an insurer must show not only that the 
insured breached the contract, but also that it was prejudiced as a result.” (footnotes omitted)); see 
also, e.g., Holt v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 623, 630 (Ariz. 1988) (in banc) (“Even if an 
insured breaches a cooperation clause, the insurer may not use that fact as a defense unless the 
breach has caused substantial prejudice.”); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374, 
386 (Tex. 1993) ( “An insurer has no obligation to indemnify an insured who fails to cooperate and 
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policyholder’s failure to appear or to provide documents per the insurer’s 
request is generally not per se sufficient to establish prejudice;83 rather, the 
insurer is required to demonstrate that the policyholder’s failure to cooperate 
prevented the insurer from pursuing a beneficial strategy that would have 
been open to it but for the policyholder’s breach.84 Many jurisdictions have 
sought to make this standard even more exacting, by stressing contract law 
requirements of materiality and substantiality.85 These requirements leave 
the door open for courts to consider whether a policyholder’s actions, in the 
aggregate, may constitute substantial compliance with the policy despite 
minor lapses in cooperation.86 Courts have also mandated that insurers 
actively attempt to secure policyholder cooperation.87 In practice, these 
 
prejudices the insurer’s rights and obligations under the policy.” (emphasis added)). But see Miller 
v. Augusta Mut. Ins. Co., 157 F. App’x. 632, 638 (4th Cir. 2005) (“A material breach of the duty 
to cooperate relieves the insurer of its liability under the policy, even if the insurer is not 
prejudiced by the lack of cooperation.” (applying Virginia law)); Am. Country Ins. Co. v. Bruhn, 
682 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997) (“The defendants claim that the [the insurer] must 
establish prejudice to deny coverage based on a lack of cooperation. However, in this case, such an 
assertion is absurd. The only way the [insurer] can prove prejudice caused by the lack of coopera-
tion is to know what [the policyholder]’s statement would have revealed. Since [he] refused to 
give . . . a statement, the [insurer] cannot know how it was prejudiced.”). 
83 See Oliff-Michael v. Mut. Benefit Ins. Co., 262 F. Supp. 2d 602, 604 (D. Md. 2003) 
(“[P]rejudice cannot be surmised or presumed from the mere fact of delay.” (citation omitted)).  
84 See, e.g., Tran v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 961 P.2d 358, 365 (Wash. 1998) (en banc) 
(“Interference with the insurer’s ability to evaluate and investigate a claim may cause actual 
prejudice.” (citation omitted)). 
85 See, e.g., Fellows v. Mauser, 302 F. Supp. 929, 934 (D. Vt. 1969) (“[B]efore there can be a 
breach of the duty to cooperate, the failure on the part of the insured must be material or 
substantial.” (citing Curran v. Conn. Indem. Co., 20 A.2d 87, 89 (Conn. 1941))); Patel v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 570 N.E.2d 357, 361 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (finding an issue for trial of whether the insured 
“substantially complied with the terms of the policy”); Gabor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
583 N.E.2d 1041, 1043 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (“To constitute a defense to liability, an insured’s lack 
of cooperation must result in material and substantial prejudice to the insurance company.” (citing 
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Holcomb, 458 N.E.2d 441, 445 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983))).  
86 See Harris v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 632 A.2d 1380, 1382 (Del. 1993) (noting 
that to establish a breach of the cooperation clause, the insurer must prove “substantial breach of 
the provision”); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Chuchanis, No. CA-6274, 1984 WL 7244, at *1 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Jan. 30, 1984) (finding the policyholder’s self-initiated admission of fault in an affidavit 
“a substantial breach of the duty to cooperate”). 
87 See, e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Irvin, 19 F. Supp. 2d 906, 910 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (“[F]or an 
insurance company to be relieved of liability based on an insured’s breach of its cooperation clause, 
the insurance company must prove . . . that the company used good faith efforts and diligence to 
obtain the insured’s cooperation . . . .”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Loester, 675 N.Y.S.2d 832, 834 
(Sup. Ct. 1998) (“The insurer must demonstrate that, (1) it acted diligently in seeking to bring 
about the insured’s co-operation, (2) the efforts employed by the carrier were reasonably 
calculated to obtain the insured’s cooperation, and (3) the attitude of the insured, after his co-
operation was sought, was one of willful and avowed obstruction.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Smith v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 830 A.2d 108, 116 (Vt. 2003) (“To successfully 
invoke a defense of noncooperation, diligent effort to secure the cooperation of a recalcitrant 
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vaguely worded, fact-specific, subjective standards provide courts not with a 
rigorous rubric by which to assess policyholder behavior, but rather with 
open-ended tools with which to combat perceived insurer opportunism.88 
This approach is fundamentally misguided, because rather than seeking 
to correct the misaligned incentives at the root of the problem, it seeks 
simply to limit the class of individuals to whom the problem applies. While 
raising the threshold for a noncooperative breach mitigates the ill effects in 
that instance, it does not eradicate them, as some noncooperation will 
undoubtedly meet the various judicial requirements described above. In 
other words, such a solution is of little consolation to victims whose policy-
holders did materially and prejudicially breach. And it is all the more 
troublesome that whether a victim’s compensation is preserved turns not on 
need, contributory culpability, or severity of injury, but on the wholly 
independent and arbitrary measure of policyholder cooperation.89 Though 
apparently designed to effectuate the compensatory goals of liability 
insurance, such an arbitrary method of determining which victims should be 
compensated is actually a perversion of those goals. The following observa-
tion of an Illinois court is illustrative:  
Because automobile policies serve to protect members of the public who are 
injured by the insured’s negligence, “an insurer will not be relieved of its 
contractual responsibilities unless it proves it was substantially prejudiced 
by the insured’s actions or conduct in regard to its investigation or presen-
tation or defense of the case.”90 
 
insured is required, and, as found by one court, it includes more than simply sending letters to the 
insured, or telephoning them and requesting their appearance at trial . . . .”). 
88 See Loester, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 834 (finding that the policyholder’s having “ignored corre-
spondence” was “palpably insufficient” to meet the “heavy” burden on insurers attempting to 
avoid indemnification because of the cooperation clause); Hazel Beh & Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
Misclassifying the Insurance Policy: The Unforced Errors of Unilateral Contract Characterization, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 85, 126 (2010) (“[T]he cooperation requirements have often not been 
stringently enforced by courts and anything resembling substantial compliance is usually 
enough . . . .”).  
89 In fact, the greater the policyholder’s culpability—in refusing to assist in the insurer’s 
defense—the less likely victim compensation becomes. Also discouraging is that it is often difficult 
to find a principle reconciling the disparate results in which cooperation clause breaches are and 
are not found to be prejudicial. Compare Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trevino, 202 S.W.3d 
811, 817 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (finding a policyholder’s cooperation clause breach prejudicial when 
he filed a pro se answer and encouraged the insurer to refuse indemnification), with Irvin, 19 F. 
Supp. 2d at 916 (finding a policyholder’s “disappear[ance] without explanation” insufficient to 
establish per se prejudice). 
90 United Auto Ins. Co. v. Buckley, 962 N.E.2d 548, 557 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (quoting 
Founders Ins. Co. v. Shaikh, 937 N.E.2d 1186, 1193 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)). 
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This statement underscores the inherent absurdity in recognizing that, 
although liability insurance is designed to address victim need in response 
to policyholder negligence, neither factor influences the division of the 
limited compensation pool.  
 In applying the test this way, courts seem content to leave the coopera-
tion clause intact, and then to arbitrarily concentrate its adverse conse-
quences on an undeserving, albeit limited, class of accident victims. Such a 
response ignores the fact that, as presently constituted, the cooperation 
clause simply cannot work in a largely judgment-proof society. When the 
environment in which a duty exists undergoes a fundamental change such 
that the obligation can no longer function as originally intended, the tenor 
of that obligation should undergo similar alteration.91  
B. Proscription of the Cooperation Clause as a Defense  
in Mandatory Liability Insurance Schemes 
A second class of response has been to prohibit insurance companies from 
raising the policyholder’s lack of cooperation as a defense to indemnification 
in mandatory insurance schemes.92 This approach pays lip service to what is 
widely acknowledged to be the legislative intent behind mandating the 
purchase of liability insurance: to provide adequate compensation for the 
victims of accidents.93 Adopting this rule, the Michigan Supreme Court 
observed that: 
 
91 Cf. Note, Taking Reichs Seriously: German Unification and the Law of State Succession, 104 
HARV. L. REV. 588, 595-96 (1990) (observing that “[u]nder the law of treaties, the principle of 
rebus sic stantibus . . . . implies that treaties have identifiable purposes and that if changes in the 
international system frustrate those purposes, states should be allowed to terminate their 
obligations” (footnote omitted)). 
92 See Coburn v. Fox, 389 N.W.2d 424, 428 (Mich. 1986) (noting that “failure of the insured 
to cooperate with the insurer is not a valid defense” in a mandatory insurance scheme); see also 
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, No. 92C-02-91, 1992 WL 301725, at *1 (Del. Super. 
Ct. Oct. 21, 1992) (holding that the Delaware statute mandating automobile liability insurance 
“bars Prudential’s attempt to have the policy declared void for the failure of a covered driver to 
cooperate”); Rodgers-Ward v. Am. Standard Ins. Co., 182 S.W.3d 589, 593 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) 
(holding that “the ‘cooperation clause’ in [the] motor vehicle liability policy is unenforceable . . . 
to the extent it purports to deny [the victim] the minimum liability coverage required by” state 
law); Tibbs v. Johnson, 632 P.2d 904, 906 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (noting that Washington’s 
insurance policy provisions “cannot be undermined by contract”). 
93 See, e.g., Walker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 661 F. Supp. 930, 932 (D. Del. 1987) 
(noting that the “requirement of mandatory insurance is intended to protect persons injured by a 
driver”), aff ’d, 845 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1988); Weeks v. Wimple, 669 F. Supp. 499, 501 (D.D.C. 
1987) (calling “the expressed purpose of the [compulsory automobile liability insurance] act to 
provide protection for all victims”); Christopher J. Robinette, Why Civil Recourse Theory Is 
Incomplete, 78 TENN. L. REV. 431, 468 n.326 (2011) (“Compulsory automobile insurance was a 
legislative attempt to further the compensation of automobile accident victims.”). 
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Allowing [the insurer] to successfully assert a defense of noncoopera-
tion . . . after plaintiffs had secured a default judgment would deny plain-
tiffs the protection intended by the no-fault act. A defendant whom 
plaintiffs had successfully sued under the no-fault act would suddenly be-
come an uninsured motorist when plaintiffs attempted to collect their 
judgment.94  
To its credit, the Coburn court recognized the inherent problem in allow-
ing policyholder action to subvert the interests of members of the “class 
intended to be protected” by the legislatively imposed liability insurance 
scheme in the first place.95 State statutes of this nature—often termed 
“financial responsibility” statutes—impose obligations that are largely uni-
form,96 and courts have widely interpreted them as creating “absolute” or 
“frozen” liability coverage,97 meaning that even a violation of the policy 
cannot defeat it.98 Of course, while this response achieves the admirable 
result of ensuring compensation for accident victims despite a policyholder’s 
failure to cooperate, such compensation is generally limited to the statutory 
minimum required amount.99 As a result, the cooperation clause continues 
 
94 Coburn, 389 N.W.2d at 429. That Michigan’s mandatory insurance derives from a no-fault 
act is irrelevant for present purposes. All states, most of which are not no-fault jurisdictions, 
mandate liability coverage, see infra note 96, and the observations of the Coburn court hinged on 
the standard rather than the unique aspects of Michigan’s scheme. 
95 Coburn, 389 N.W.2d at 429. 
96 See 16 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 49:33 (4th ed. 2011) [hereinaf-
ter 16 WILLISTON] (“[C]ompulsory insurance and ‘financial responsibility’ legislation has been 
adopted in all states, making automobile liability insurance mandatory . . . . The basic thrust of 
these acts is to encourage motorists to procure and maintain automobile liability insurance so that 
victims of motor vehicle accidents will have a reliable source from which to seek compensation for 
their injuries.”).  
97 Tibbs, 632 P.2d at 907.  
98 See 16 WILLISTON, supra note 96, § 49:33 (“Motor vehicle financial responsibility laws are 
remedial statutes and are therefore liberally construed with the goal of effectuating their purposes. 
Since the purpose of these statutes is to protect innocent individuals who are injured by financially 
irresponsible drivers, a number of courts interpret their acts to provide the greatest possible 
protection to persons within their ambit. Moreover, it has been said that financial responsibility 
statutes are declaratory of a public policy that supersedes any more general public policy 
applicable to ordinary insurance law or contracts.” (footnotes omitted)). For an example of a court 
construing statutory language in this fashion, see Tibbs, 632 P.2d at 907. 
99 In United Services Automobile Ass’n v. Markosky, the argument was proffered “that liability 
coverage in excess of the statutory minimum limits is, in effect, mandatory from the perspective of 
the insurer” and that the public policy considerations that prevented an insurer from denying 
coverage to a noncooperative policyholder up to the statutory limits demanded the same result for 
coverage in excess of those limits. 530 S.E.2d 660, 663-64 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000). The court flatly 
rejected this argument, however, observing that to extend absolute liability beyond statutory 
minimums would be to “construe the plain language of the statute to extend the public policy 
beyond that which was plainly intended.” Id. at 664.  
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to provide insurers with a valid tool to escape indemnification for policy-
holder liability beyond the statutory minimum. 100  Surely, there is an 
argument that because coverage beyond the statutory minimum is uncom-
mon,101 a solution that threatens above-minimum coverage in some acci-
dents while guaranteeing at least minimum coverage to all victims is a good 
compromise. I offer a twofold counter. First, it fails to go far enough; 
fairness demands that all bargained-for liability coverage be preserved in 
the face of policyholder noncooperation. Second, coverage above the 
minimum, however rare, should be encouraged and protected rather than 
jettisoned as a rarity not worth the structural support. 
That said, a system that preserves minimum coverage achieves much 
that is desirable. It recognizes that both the judgment-proof policyholder’s 
disincentive to cooperate and the insurance company’s incentive toward 
opportunistic policy nullification can combine to harm innocent victims of 
accidents, and it partially rectifies that problem by guaranteeing that at least 
a portion of those accident victims receive at least a portion of applicable 
insurance proceeds. But beyond the readily apparent shortcoming—that this 
solution ignores the class of victims who are deprived of compensation from 
applicable, but not mandatory, liability insurance102—this solution has two 
major pitfalls.  
 First, the statutory minimum coverage is painfully inadequate.103 This 
problem may appear to be purely legislative. Perhaps, because a judgment-
proof defendant cannot be expected to purchase insurance beyond the 
minimally required amount, capping victim compensation at this level is the 
best we can do. If victim compensation depends on a higher level of mini-
mum coverage, the argument goes, that is a task for the legislature. Two 
 
100 See, e.g., Harris v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 632 A.2d 1380, 1382 (Del. 1993) 
(forcing the insurer to provide the victim only the statutory minimum of $15,000 when the 
noncooperative policyholder had a $100,000 liability limit and the victim had won a judgment of 
$54,000). 
101 Stephen Brobeck & J. Robert Hunter, Lower-Income Households and the Auto Insurance 
Marketplace: Challenges and Opportunities, CONSUMER FED’N AM. ( Jan. 30, 2012), http://www. 
consumerfed.org/news/450 (noting the infrequency with which low-to-moderate income families 
purchase auto liability insurance beyond the minimum amount required). 
102 Despite its status as a nonmandatory liability insurance, homeowner’s liability insurance, 
due to its prevalence as an attachment to the insurance policies required by most mortgage 
companies and its relatively low cost, often represents a victim’s only chance at recovering tort 
damages for everyday harms.  
103 See Brobeck & Hunter, supra note 101 (surveying minimum coverage amounts by state 
and noting that they are often “not sufficient to fully compensate other motorists involved in 
serious crashes who are not deemed at fault”); see also Ron Lieber, Consider Worst Case with Zipcar, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2011, at B1 (criticizing “the pathetically low bare (automobile liability) 
minimums that each state requires”).  
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observations weaken this argument. First, minimum coverage is calibrated 
not to what victims need but to what policyholders can reasonably afford. If 
insurance were cheaper, policyholders—and, consequently, victims—would 
get more coverage for their money. By mandating coverage without ad-
dressing the fundamentally misaligned incentive, this class of solution risks 
both making insurance more expensive and compounding the inadequacy of 
minimum coverage. While a judgment-proof policyholder might choose to 
cooperate despite having no economic inventive to do so (for instance, if he 
feels a moral obligation to the victim104) that policyholder has even less of an 
incentive to cooperate if he knows that his insurance proceeds will go to the 
victim whether he cooperates or not.105 Widespread lack of policyholder 
cooperation may lead to increased costs for insurance companies, higher 
premiums, and less coverage for the minimum amount paid. Moreover, 
people do insure beyond the minimum amount. To the extent a victim’s 
need likewise exceeds minimums, we should seek a solution that preserves 
the entirety of the policyholder’s coverage.  
The second major pitfall of the “frozen liability” class of solutions is that 
it fails to protect insurer interests, one of the purported goals of the cooper-
ation clause. Instead, this solution pushes the claims process in practice 
further and further from the truth-serving ideal embodied in the coopera-
tion clause’s language.106 As discussed above, with such a solution in place, 
judgment-proof policyholders have even less of an incentive to cooperate 
than they do without one. As such, this solution seems less concerned with 
unveiling the truth about accidents and assigning liability correctly than it 
does with providing at least some financial redress to victims. Such a step 
blurs the line between mandatory liability insurance schemes and limited 
victim compensation funds.  
Clearly that is not all bad. If one of the primary goals of liability insur-
ance in the first place is to ensure that funds are available to compensate 
victims of accidents, then perhaps the system’s increasing resemblance to an 
automatic no-fault fund is encouraging. But a response that systematically 
subordinates the interests of insurance companies in favor of the public 
 
104 See supra note 34. 
105 In fact, there is a chance that the policyholder’s cooperation might decrease the victim’s 
chances at receiving the compensation. Thus a policyholder who feels morally obligated to ensure 
his insurance proceeds flow to the victim, who knows that his cooperation might reveal facts that 
would threaten the policy’s applicability, and who knows that noncooperation is not a defense, 
may very well opt to ignore his insurer completely. To be sure, this approximates a sort of 
unilateral collusion, but is unlikely to threaten victim compensation under a “frozen liability” 
scheme.  
106 See supra text accompanying notes 31-32. 
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good is myopic. Such efforts will invariably be met with a robust and 
organized opposition that will delay and mitigate the effectiveness of any 
solution. Insurer interests are best served when policyholders truthfully and 
actively participate in the claims process, thereby allowing the insurer to 
effectively negotiate fair settlement prices and curb expenditures. Insurance 
companies, as members of the private sector, compete to offer a better 
product than their competitors, and to do so more efficiently. We should 
seek a solution that recognizes and embraces this fact and attempts to 
remedy cooperation clause problems within that framework.  
IV. THE COOPERATION CLAUSE REIMAGINED 
Combined, the above responses paint a picture of judicial and legislative 
reactions to the cooperation clause problem that both recognize the misa-
ligned incentive structure and begin to craft solutions that favor accident 
victims. But while those solutions attack the reach of the cooperation clause, 
the solution proposed by this Comment instead targets the remedy for a 
violation in an effort to realign incentives and restore the clause’s intended 
efficacy. Two goals are centrally important to this proposed solution. First, 
it must place all or substantially all of the cost of a cooperation clause 
violation on the breaching policyholder himself rather than on the accident 
victim. Second, it must redesign that cost such that it functions as a mean-
ingful incentive for judgment-proof policyholders to actively cooperate. A 
tentative path—with both a contractual and a legislative component—
toward these goals follows.  
A. A Contractual Response 
The contractual component of the response centers upon the remedy for 
a cooperation clause violation. Rather than negating the whole policy and 
nullifying the insurer’s duty to indemnify the policyholder’s liability, a 
breach of the cooperation clause should result in the activation of a cost-
shifting mechanism, whereby the insurer can recover the defense costs, but 
not the actual amount indemnified, from the noncooperative policyholder. 
Under this structure, the insurer would be responsible for indemnifying up 
to policy limits whenever the policyholder were found liable (or the insurer 
decided to settle). Following this indemnification, though, an insurer would 
be free to initiate an action for defense costs against the noncooperative 
policyholder.  
In addition to protecting victims, this arrangement serves two important 
purposes. First, it serves a collectibility function by getting around the 
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judgment-proof problem. The costs of an insurer’s defense of a policyholder 
are much more likely to be collectible from the policyholder—even a poor 
one—than is the entire judgment amount, because for the experienced 
insurers these are not expensive lawsuits.107 Far from the headline-grabbing 
legal fees of complex corporate litigation, the defense costs in these types of 
cases are likely kept quite low by the frequency with which cases settle and 
the streamlined claims process in place at most insurance companies.108 
Second, this mechanism serves a positioning function. Rather than pitting 
the victim of the accident against either the insurer or the breaching 
policyholder, this mechanism places the onus for collection on the insurance 
company, a repeat player with both the expertise and the resources to 
efficiently and effectively pursue such actions. Ideally, the obligation to pay 
defense costs could function as a fine that insurers could levy upon non-
cooperative policyholders backed by the coercive power of an eminently 
collectible legal judgment as an alternative.  
This latter positioning point is of particular importance. As it stands 
now, the majority of cooperation clause litigation takes place between the 
accident victim and the insurer, while the party presumably most responsible 
for both the accident and the denial of compensation simply settles, assigns, 
and disappears. This component of the solution would free the victim of 
this bureaucratic burden and remove ancillary financial disincentives to the 
victim’s pursuit of rightful compensation. To be sure, classification of this 
revised remedy as strictly within the terms of the liability contract does not 
tell the whole story; it would be disingenuous to attempt this reconsidera-
tion of duties from a purely interpretive standpoint.109 Full realization of 
this goal is likely to necessitate some form of legislative or administrative 
action, such as an insurance commission regulation prohibiting insurance 
companies from denying indemnification based wholly on post-accident 
policyholder activity. Such a rule would ideally preserve the right of 
 
107 Professor Stephen Gilles has observed that “almost everyone could pay a $1000 claim in 
full—if not in a lump sum, then in periodic installments. Claims of that magnitude, however, are 
normally too small to be worth litigating under the standard contingent-fee arrangement, which 
typically gives the plaintiff’s attorney one-third of the judgment or settlement.” Gilles, supra note 
29, at 608.  
108 Additionally, the settlement negotiation process will ideally be less complex. If the insurer 
knows that its duty to indemnify is tied solely to policyholder liability rather than being impacted 
by post-loss policyholder behavior, there is presumably less traction for complex settlement 
negotiations.  
109 It would not be rigorously honest to attempt to classify a policyholder who has failed to 
cooperate as having substantially complied with the terms of the policy, as compliance with the 
cooperation clause in its present form has rightfully been considered a condition precedent. See, 
e.g., Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trevino, 202 S.W.3d 811, 816 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006).  
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insurers to refuse indemnification based both on collusive schemes between 
the policyholder and the victim—as that could not properly be termed 
wholly policyholder behavior—and on pre-accident policyholder behavior 
such as application fraud.110  
B. A Legislative Response 
The second component of my solution is legislative in nature, and has as 
its goal the creation of a more powerful incentive for policyholders to 
cooperate. If policyholders indeed respond to such incentives, and if the 
judgment-proof problem can be overcome, then the class of disputes 
implicating cooperation clause violations will shrink considerably. In my 
view, state legislatures should impose criminal sanctions on noncooperative 
policyholders. Penalties could entail fines, or in the case of automobile 
insurance, the suspension of the policyholder’s driver’s license. This re-
sponse is both perfectly reasonable and potentially very effective.  
It is reasonable in two regards. First, the idea of sanctions as an enforce-
ment mechanism for insurance obligations is not a new one. Every state 
punishes its citizens who drive cars without purchasing the minimum 
liability coverage.111 Use of a state’s criminal justice apparatus to assure 
socially optimal behavior is neither a new concept nor one that is overly 
harsh in this context, especially when one considers both the noncooperative 
policyholder’s culpability and his relatively low compliance costs. Second, 
state punishment of the failure to purchase mandatory insurance stems from 
the legislative conviction that victim compensation is a social good worthy of 
the criminal justice system’s protection. As demonstrated, a policyholder’s 
noncooperation often has the same effects vis-à-vis victim compensation as 
would a failure to purchase insurance in the first place. The protection 
afforded by existing criminal statutes and that of the present proposal both 
 
110 In contrast to his lack of cooperation, a policyholder’s fraudulent representation on an 
insurance application much more dramatically alters the lens through which we consider the policy 
and whether the insurer should be able to avoid its obligations. If the policyholder has not been 
truthful in his disclosure, the policyholder has been unjustly enriched through the receipt of more 
insurance at a cheaper price than would presumably have been available to him had he been 
completely forthcoming. If the insurer fully indemnifies in this situation, it will have financed the 
policyholder’s fraud. Exploration of the notion that insurers should be forced to fully indemnify 
and then permitted to recover from the policyholder the difference between the premiums they 
did pay and the premiums they would have paid had they been truthful is a topic for another day. 
111 See Jeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 5 
CONN. INS. L.J. 295, 308 n.67 (1998) (“Automobile insurance is required as a condition to driving 
in most states . . . .” (citing ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 
§ 132(a)(2) (2d. ed. 1996))); see also id. (“[M]ost lenders will require homeowners insurance as a 
condition of financing the purchase of a home.”). 
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seek to prevent identical ills. Admittedly, it takes a leap to extend this 
protection beyond the mandatory insurance realm, but the centrality of 
liability insurance to a state’s tort law system should empower state legisla-
tures to take a bigger hand in regulating policyholder behavior.  
Support for this component’s effectiveness is likewise twofold. First, a 
criminal sanction will function as a much more powerful incentive to 
cooperation than nullification of the policy. A small fine poses few collecti-
bility concerns, and suspension of a license is an unavoidable and uniformly 
applicable consequence. It also draws coercive power from both the stigma 
and the collateral consequences of a criminal penalty. Second, it once again 
removes victim-level barriers to compensation by ensuring that neither the 
negative consequences nor the enforcement obligations of the cooperation 
clause lie with the victim.  
This solution also more vigorously protects the insurer’s interests. 
While, as previously mentioned, nullification of a policy is clearly in the 
insurer’s interest, and this solution limits insurers’ ability to avoid their 
obligations, this burden is purely financial; insurers will adjust premiums to 
compensate for any significant adverse financial impact. The real benefit to 
insurers derives from the truth-serving function that increased cooperation 
will promote. Insurance companies compete with one another to design and 
implement the most cost-efficient claims management processes. To 
succeed and maximize profits, an insurance company needs to outperform 
its competitors in this regard. The more information regarding an accident 
that is available to an insurer, the more that insurer’s relative competitive 
advantage will be tied to things within its control, such as the design of its 
claims process, the competency of its adjusters, and the effectiveness of its 
settlement negotiations. A minor financial disadvantage resulting from 
having to indemnify a greater number of losses is easily mitigated by 
modest premium hikes. But the informational disadvantage brought about 
by the cooperation clause’s current failure to incentivize the truth moves the 
industry toward an undesirable corporate playing field on which innovative 
design and corporate competency play too small a role in creating a compet-
itive advantage.  
C. A Tailored Fifth Amendment Response 
Ideally, the above two solutions will work in concert both to encourage 
greater levels of cooperation and to preserve compensation for victims. 
There is, however, one class of noncooperative policyholder for whom 
criminal punishment would be problematic—those policyholders invoking 
their Fifth Amendment rights in a parallel criminal case. Arguably, it would 
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be impermissible to hold a policyholder criminally liable for the collateral 
consequences of his invocation of a constitutional right.112 Thus the Fifth 
Amendment problem demands an alternative solution to replace the imposi-
tion of criminal sanctions.113 I propose two: a judicial/interpretive solution, 
and in the alternative, a legislative one.  
The first begins with a question: If noncooperation is subject to a rule of 
reasonableness, what is so unreasonable about refusing to cooperate when to 
do so may hasten criminal liability?114 While such a litigation strategy surely 
faces an upstream swim against the flow of precedent,115 momentary reflec-
tion will reveal that this is an eminently sensible query. Hence, the proposal 
is that courts consider policyholders who fail to cooperate due to their 
invocation of the Fifth Amendment to have nevertheless substantially 
complied with their policies. This proposal is consistent with the existing, 
obvious limits to a court’s finding of noncooperation. One cannot imagine a 
court declaring a policyholder in breach if he was kidnapped and thus 
unable to respond to his insurer’s phone calls. Similarly—though a slightly 
less extreme case—a court would refuse to find a breach if cooperation were 
possible only under circumstances that would place the policyholder in 
grave danger. This exercise is likely to be purely theoretical given the 
farfetched nature of the factual suppositions, but if our intuition is to excuse 
noncooperation in those cases, why not also when cooperation is possible 
only under circumstances that would create a substantial likelihood of 
 
112 Courts are in agreement that nullification of the insurance policy is a permissible conse-
quence of a defendant’s invocation of Fifth Amendment rights. See Miller v. Augusta Mut. Ins. 
Co., 157 F. App’x 632, 638 n.6 (4th Cir. 2005) (permitting “the blanket invocation of his Fifth 
Amendment rights [to] sufficiently establish[] the policyholder’s failure to cooperate”). That 
would perhaps not be true if the consequences were criminal in nature. See United States v. 
Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968) (holding that legislative objectives “cannot be pursued by means 
that needlessly chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights”). The basic difference here is that 
policy nullification is a consequence imposed by a private party pursuant to a consensual bilateral 
contract, while a criminal sanction is unilaterally imposed by the State. Though it is not entirely 
clear whether courts would consider such an imposition “needless,” given the goal of encouraging 
cooperation, it is clear that the criminalization of a refusal to provide potentially self-incriminating 
testimony faces an uphill battle to constitutionality in any context. 
113 This should not come as a surprise. A policyholder who invokes his Fifth Amendment 
right does so because he is backed into the Hobson’s choice of criminal or civil liability. That is a 
markedly different situation from the prototypical noncooperative policyholder who chooses 
inaction over action because the former is both easier and lacking a downside. Identical conse-
quences for the accident victim unite these two noncooperative policyholders, but because the 
underlying incentives to which they respond differ widely, a one-size-fits-all solution is inappro-
priate. 
114 For this central question and the rhetorical answer it begs, credit is owed to Professor 
Tom Baker. 
115 See supra Section II.B. 
  
618 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 585 
 
criminal liability, or even incarceration? One possible criticism is that there 
is a moral component to the Fifth Amendment case—that allowing invoca-
tion to leave intact the possibility of indemnification rewards criminals. 
While this answer may carry intuitive merit, it falls apart when we consider 
that for judgment-proof defendants, the real beneficiary of indemnification 
is the victim. There is no windfall to a judgment-proof criminal defendant 
in avoiding civil liability.  
The second potential replacement for criminal sanctions to remedy the 
Fifth Amendment problem is a legislative grant of immunity for all testi-
mony in civil insurance proceedings. The Supreme Court has held “immun-
ity from use and derivative use” of testimony a valid substitute for the 
privilege against compelled self-incrimination.116 Thus, if a state legislature 
declared that any statement made in a civil insurance proceeding, or under 
oath to an insurer, could not be used to prosecute or develop leads against 
the policyholder in a parallel criminal proceeding, then the compulsion of 
policyholder testimony would be constitutional. There appear to be few 
disadvantages to the grant of such immunity. Without it, policyholders will 
refuse to cooperate and potentially deprive accident victims of compensa-
tion while prosecutors must proceed without a statement from the policy-
holder-defendant; with the immunity, policyholders cooperate and preserve 
compensation for their victims, while prosecutors must still proceed without 
a statement from the policyholder-defendant. In practice, such immunity 
can be difficult to police, as it may be hard to prove that the prosecution did 
in fact draw a lead from immunized testimony, but characteristics unique to 
the insurance context allay such concerns. First, it will be quite easy to 
shield this testimony from prosecutors, especially if it comes during a 
closed-door deposition. Furthermore, because insurance companies notori-
ously delay action on claims,117 there is a reasonable probability that the 
immunized testimony will follow the resolution of the criminal case.  
D. Observations on the Impact on Premiums 
As mentioned above, because this solution limits the instances in which 
an insurer can refuse to indemnify a policyholder’s liability, it poses the risk 
that premiums will increase as insurers attempt to cover these increased 
 
116 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972); see also id. at 462 (holding that be-
cause use and derivative use immunity “leaves the witness and the prosecutorial authorities in 
substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege[,]” 
compelled testimony under such an immunity is constitutional). 
117 See supra notes 43-44. 
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expenditures.118 Beginning with the assertion that it is impossible to gauge 
ex ante the effect a change such as this one will have on premiums, I 
nonetheless offer three observations designed to mitigate concerns over 
premium increases. First, the truth-serving function of this solution may 
serve to decrease settlement amounts for legitimate reasons. Cooperative 
policyholders with actual incentives to engage in the claims process may 
provide their insurers with leverage in the settlement negotiation process. 
While doctrines like assumption of risk and contributory negligence are 
unlikely to be litigated with any real frequency given the heavy settlement 
environment, facts implicating such factors may decrease settlement 
amounts and curb insurer expenses. 119  Second, even if premiums did 
increase as a result of this scheme, it is unlikely that such an increase would 
be significant. It is important to note that this solution implicates only the 
liability component of automobile and homeowner’s policies, for which the 
corresponding proportion of the premiums is often very low.120 Finally, this 
solution merely represents an effort to shift that portion of the cost of 
accidents currently borne by the victims themselves onto the party best 
positioned both to internalize and to spread those costs—the insurance 
company.121 As all policyholders are potential victims of judgment-proof 
tortfeasors,122 a modest premium hike that brings with it a greater likelihood 
of recovery—if such an injury were to occur—is a mutually beneficial 
exchange.  
 
118 See Suzanne Yelen, Note, Withdrawal Restrictions in the Automobile Insurance Market, 102 
YALE L.J. 1431, 1445 (1993) (observing that the mere anticipation of increased costs as a result of 
new regulation or legislation often leads to increases in premiums).  
119 Because tort victims generally collect far below their actual need, what I term decreases in 
settlement for legitimate reasons are still likely to leave victims undercompensated vis-à-vis what they 
would get if they went to trial. Without drastic increases in state mandatory minimums, however, 
the tort system will never be able to fully compensate victims for their losses. In the absence of 
complete compensation, we should at least strive for a system that compensates victims propor-
tionately according to the relative merits of their cases.  
120 See GEICO, Family Auto Policy (Policy no. [redacted]) (on file with author) (setting the 
six month premium for $300,000 per victim of bodily injury liability—well beyond the statutory 
minimum coverage—at a mere $91.30 every six months, or less than 25% of the total premium).  
121 Liability insurance itself is designed to serve this very goal. See Richard B. Stewart, Crisis 
in Tort Law? The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 184, 187 (1987) (advocating strict 
enterprise liability in torts “because the enterprise is in the best position to spread the risk of 
injury through liability insurance”). By allowing insurers to foist concentrated costs back onto 
accident victims, the cooperation clause subverts the institution of liability insurance. Because the 
modern tort system depends so greatly upon liability insurance to ensure its ability to continue to 
serve its compensatory purpose, see supra note 29, the cooperation clause likewise threatens the 
tort system itself. 
122 See ABRAHAM, supra note 25, at 102 (“[H]aving an auto accident has become an unfortu-
nate yet unsurprising occurrence in the lives of ordinary people . . . .”). 
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CONCLUSION 
The solution outlined above ameliorates the potential harm caused by all 
three categories of noncooperation. First, the prototypical noncooperative 
policyholder is prevented from unilaterally depriving his victim of compen-
sation through his refusal to respond to insurer requests. Though potential 
criminal sanctions—the threat of driver’s license suspension and a more 
collectible fine—will combine to deter blatant noncooperation, the victim is 
not the one who bears the costs in the event that such deterrence fails. In 
bearing that cost, the insurer indemnifies the policyholder against a loss 
contemplated and bargained for in the policy and retains the ability to 
recoup defense costs—something it would be unable to do in the event of 
full cooperation. Second, a policyholder invoking his Fifth Amendment 
right to silence no longer foists the costs of the accident onto his victim. 
According to my view, liability insurance claims parallel to a criminal 
charge are treated as sufficiently distinct from one another, and the former 
are able to proceed by design. Whether this happens by immunity or 
through a new judicial interpretation of the cooperation clause, the accident 
victim is no longer forced to subsidize the constitutional rights of the 
individual who caused the accident. Finally, when a policyholder settles 
without the insurer’s consent, the victim of the accident will not be penalized 
for the policyholder’s informational deficiency. Though the problem of 
policyholder settlement without consent demands better education of policy-
holders to inform them that such settlements violate the terms of the policy, 
when such efforts fail, this solution preserves compensation for the victim.  
The prevalence of liability insurance today has enabled great strides to-
ward solving the problem of victim undercompensation. Without the 
provision of effective and well-regulated liability insurance, plaintiffs would 
be almost completely deprived of any opportunity to collect on hard-fought 
and deserved judgments, and the tort system would devolve into little more 
than an arena in which to assign blame. But while liability insurance in 
many ways rectifies the collection problems posed by a largely judgment-
proof society, it is nonetheless not immune from letting that same judgment-
proofness subvert much of the good that has been done. 
The cooperation clause poses this very risk. Designed to encourage 
truthful cooperation by policyholders by threatening personal liability, 
neither the threat nor the goal enjoy any efficacy in a world that is largely 
judgment-proof. When policyholders react to the economic incentives 
created by the combination of their freedom from personal liability and the 
cooperative obligations imposed upon them, they threaten victim compensa-
tion. That this is not a rampant problem owes largely to most policyholders’ 
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refusal to follow (or understand) these perverse economic incentives. 
Rather than relying on policyholders’ good will and sense of moral obliga-
tion, we should instead redesign the cooperation clause so that it can serve 
its worthy purpose without the risk of rational policyholder subversion.  
 
 
 
